How can we learn a classi er that is "fair" for a protected or sensitive group, when we do not know if the input to the classi er belongs to the protected group? How can we train such a classi er when data on the protected group is di cult to a ain? In many settings, nding out the sensitive input a ribute can be prohibitively expensive even during model training, and sometimes impossible during model serving. For example, in recommender systems, if we want to predict if a user will click on a given recommendation, we o en do not know many a ributes of the user, e.g., race or age, and many a ributes of the content are hard to determine, e.g., the language or topic. us, it is not feasible to use a di erent classi er calibrated based on knowledge of the sensitive a ribute.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, researchers have recognized unfairness in ML models as a signi cant issue. In numerous cases, machine learned models o er much worse quality results for a protected group than for the population overall. e problem has garnered signi cant a ention in the research community, with some working to de ne and understand "fairness, " and others working to develop techniques to "de-bias" ML algorithms and models.
One commonly understood source of bias is skewed data-for example, when a group of users is underrepresented in the training data and, as a result, the model is less accurate for that group [1, 2] . However, much of the recent work on de-biasing models ignores the implications of the data used to perform the de-biasing.
We consider the case where it is di cult or expensive to nd out if a datapoint is from the protected group or not, i.e., to get labels of the sensitive a ribute. is is common in many cases, such as when the sensitive a ribute is private, such as personal information about a user, or when the sensitive a ribute is in some way imprecisely de ned, such as what topic a piece of user generated FAT/ML '17, Halifax, Canada content is about. e scarcity of data can be further exacerbated by the underlying skew in data distribution. For example, if only 5% of examples belong to the protected class, it would require labeling a much larger random sample of data in order to have a large dataset for both the protected class and the general population.
ere are two signi cant implications of this constraint. First, during model training, any method used to de-bias the underlying model or learn a "fair" model must account for the limited and o en skewed data about the bias, lest the de-biasing algorithm fall victim to the same issues as the original model. While a few model structures have been proposed that are related to the approach we take here, they do not study or discuss the e ect of limited training data [3, 6] .
Second, a er the de-biased model is trained and when it is applied as a predictor for unlabeled data, it cannot rely on knowing if the example in question is from the protected class or not. Recent literature sharpening the de nition of fairness has relied on a calibration procedure that breaks this constraint [7, 8] .
In this work, we explore both of these problems by using adversarial learning to de-bias latent representations. at is, we build a multi-head deep neural network (DNN) where the model is trying to predict the target class with one head while simultaneously preventing the second head from being able to accurately predict the sensitive a ribute. With this approach, we make the following contributions:
(1) We connect theoretically the di erent de nitions of fairness with the adversarial training objective and the choice of dataset used for the adversary. (2) We explore empirically how much data is needed to e ectively de-bias a learned ML model. (3) We study empirically how di erent data distributions use in the adversarial learning e ect the resulting fairness of the model.
RELATED WORK
Fairness De nitions. As fairness in machine learning has become a societal focus, researchers have tried to develop useful de nitions of "fairness" in machine learning systems. Notably, Hardt et al. and Kleinberg et al. [7, 8] have both o ered novel theoretical work explaining the trade-o s between demographic parity, previously focused on as "fair," and alternative formulations focused more closely on model accuracy. We will primarily work o of the de nitions o ered in [7] .
Along with the theoretical underpinnings, Hardt et al. [7] o ers a method for achieving equality of opportunity, but does so through a post-processing algorithm, taking as input the model's prediction and the sensitive a ribute. Kleinberg et al. [8] calibration technique to achieve fairness. ese approaches are also problematic in many cases when the sensitive a ribute is not observable at inference time.
Fair-er Machine Learning. A growing body of literature is aimed at improving model performance for underserved parts of the data. For example, Beutel et al. [1] uses hyperparameter optimization to improve model performance for underserved regions of the data in collaborative ltering. More directly in the "fairness" literature, Zemel et al. [11] rst a empted to learn "fair" latent representations by directly enforcing statistical parity during unsupervised learning.
Adversarial Training. Combining competing tasks has been found to be a useful tool in deep learning. In particular, researchers have included an adversary to help compensate for skewed data distributions in domain adaptation problems for robotics and simulations [3, 6] . Researchers have also applied similar techniques for making models fair by trying to prevent biased latent representations [5, 10] . is literature has generally not been as precise in terms of which de nition of fairness they are optimizing for and what data is used for the adversarial objective. If the de nition is mentioned at all, the work o en focuses on demographic parity, which, as Hardt et al. [7] explains, has many drawbacks. We explore the intersection of these research e orts.
MODEL STRUCTURE AND LEARNING
e adversarial training procedure described here is closely related to Edwards and Storkey [5] , but we describe it here for completeness and to explain in detail how our learning procedure di ers from classic approaches.
Model Structure
Our primary task is given input X to predict some label Y . In this case Y can be either real or categorical. We assume that we have a model of the form Y = f ( (X )) where (X ) produces an embedding h and f (h) produces a prediction Y . Note here f and can be arbitrary neural networks with parameters learned through typical back propagation.
We assume that, for each example, there exists a feature Z that we consider to be sensitive or protected, and for which we want our predictions to be independent of this feature. Importantly, even if the feature Z is not used as an input to , it may be correlated with other observed features.
Additionally, we assume that we can observe Z for some subset of X , and let's call this set S. We then train a second adversarial classi er a( (S)) = Z . Note that is the same function as above, but a(h) is a new function that predicts Z , given the hidden embedding h.
Learning Algorithm
Our goal is for f ( (X )) to predict Y and a(h) to predict Z as well as possible, but for () to make it hard for adversary a() to predict Z . To be more precise, we assume we have a normal loss L Y (f ( (X )), Y ) for predicting Y , such as cross entropy loss for classi cation or squared error for regression. We also assume we have a cross entropy classi cation loss L Z (a( (S)), Z ) for predicting Z .
However, if we were to minimize L Y + L Z , then (X ) would be encouraged to predict Z , rather than discouraged. As such, we make the following change: L Z (a( λ ( (S))), Z ). Here λ is an identity function with a negative gradient. at is, ( (S)) = (S) and
dS . As a result, while a() is trained to minimize the classi cation error, () is trained to maximize the classi cation error for Z . erefore, () is trained from L Y to predict Y and from L Z to not encode any information allowing the model to predict Z . λ determines the trade-o between accuracy and removing information about sensitive a ribute Z .
As such, we train our model with the following objective:
DATA SELECTION & FAIRNESS DEFINITION
One key point that is o en overlooked is the properties of dataset S. Because obtaining S can be di cult, we ask: what are the implications of the distribution of S over Y and Z ? Interestingly, we nd that the distribution over Y corresponds to di erent de nitions of fairness. In explaining this connection, we consider a hypothetical example of a model trained to predict if a piece of content is "dangerous" Y , but would like to avoid biasing by topic Z . If the adversarial head of our model uses data S that contains both Y = 1 and Y = 0, then the model will be encouraged to never encode information about the sensitive a ribute Z , e.g. the topic. at is, latent representation h would be uncorrelated with Z . One result of that is that the probability of predicting whether the content is dangerousŶ is independent of topic Z ; that is P(Ŷ = 1|Z = 1) = P(Ŷ = 1|Z = 0). is independence between prediction Y and sensitive a ribute Z is known as demographic parity.
In contrast, consider the case of the adversarial head of our model only using data for Y = 1 (not dangerous content). In that case, the model is trained to not encode information about the topic Z only when the content is not dangerous (Y = 1). Note, this means the model can still encode topic-speci c features for why content could be dangerous, such as speci c hate slurs.
Probabilistically, this can be stated as h should be uncorrelated with topic Z when the content is not dangerous Y = 1. As a result, the probability of predicting whether the content is dangerousŶ is independent of Z conditioned on the content actually being not dangerous Y = 1. Mathematically, that is P(Ŷ = 1|Y = 1, Z = 1) = P(Ŷ = 1|Y = 1, Z = 0). Interestingly, this is precisely Hardt et al. 's equality of opportunity [7] . Finally, we can enforce the reciprocal equality of opportunity statement. If the adversarial head is only trained on data for dangerous content Y = 0, the model is encouraged to predict that dangerous content is no more or less likely to be dangerous based on its topic. Mathematically, that is P(Ŷ = 0|Y = 0,
is is still equality of opportunity but for the negative class Y = 0.
Given these theoretical connections, we now consider: how do these di erent training procedures e ect our models in practice?
EXPERIMENTS
We now explore empirically what are the e ects of using di erent data distributions for the adversarial head of our model and observe whether the experimental results align with the theoretical connections described in Section 4.
Data.
We run experiments on the Adult dataset from the UCI repository [9] . Here, we try to predict whether a person's income is above or below $50,000 and we consider the person's gender to be a sensitive a ribute. e dataset is skewed with 67% men. One interesting property of this dataset is that there isn't demographic parity in the underlying data: 30.6% of men in the dataset made over $50,000, but only 16.5% of women did as well. Additionally, only 15% of the people making over $50,000 were female. e complete breakdown is shown in Table 1 . Results are reported on a test set of 8140 users.
Model. We train a model with a single 128-width ReLU hidden layer. Both the adversarial head and the primary head are trained with a logistic loss function, and we use the Adagrad [4] optimizer in Tensor ow with step size 0.01 for 100,000 steps. We use a batch size of 32 for both heads of the model. Each head uses a di erent input stream so that we can vary the data distribution for the two heads separately. In each experiment, we run the training procedure 10 times and average the results. Each model's classi cation threshold is calibrated to match the overall distribution in the training data.
Metrics. In addition to the typical accuracy, we will track two measures used in the fairness literature. To understand the demographic parity, we will track:
Here N z is the number of examples with sensitive a ribute set to z, and T P z and F P z are the number of true positive and false positives in class z, respectively. To understand the equality of opportunity we measure:
With these two terms, we de ne our two metrics of fairness:
Note, for both of these measures, lower is be er.
Experimental Variants. We explore a few di erent variants of training procedures to understand the impact of training data for the adversarial head on accuracy and model fairness. In particular, we vary the distribution over sensitive a ribute Z , the distribution over target Y , and the size of the data. We test with two di erent distributions over Z : (1) unbalanced: the distribution over Z matches the distribution of the overall training data, (2) Because the adversarial dataset is much smaller than general training dataset, we will reuse data in the adversarial dataset at a much higher rate than the general dataset. Finally, in each experiment, we vary the adversarial weight λ and observe the e ect on metrics.
Baseline. We consider as a baseline the performance when there is no adversarial head. ere, we observe an accuracy of 0.8233, Equality ≤50K = 0.1076, Equality >50K = 0.0589, and Parity = 0.1911. e experiments below primarily decrease accuracy but improve fairness; as we are primarily interested in the relative e ects of the di erent adversarial modeling choices, we do not repeat the baseline results below.
Skew in Sensitive Attribute
One of the most signi cant ndings is that the distribution of examples over the sensitive a ribute is crucially important to the performance of the adversary. We run experiments with both balanced and unbalanced distribution over Z . We show the results for balanced data in Figure 2 and unbalanced data in Figure 3 . As is clear, using balanced data results in a much stronger e ect from the adversarial training. Most obviously, we see that the balanced data stabilizes the model, with much smaller standard deviation over results with the exact same training procedure. Second, we observe that the balanced data much more signi cantly improves the fairness of the models (across all metrics) but also decreases the accuracy of the model in the process.
Skew in Primary Label
Next we study the e ect of the distribution over the primary label Y .
at is, we consider cases where our adversarial head is trained on data exclusively from users with low income (≤50K), high income (> 50K) or an equal balance of both. As was described in Section 4, these di erent distributions theoretically align with di erent de nitions of "fairness." As can be seen in Figure 2 , we nd that di erent distributions give signi cantly di erent results. Matching the theory in Section 4, we nd that the using data from high income users most helps improve equality of opportunity for the high income label, and using data from low income users most helps improve equality of opportunity for the low income label. Using data from both groups helps on all metrics.
Amount of Data
Additionally, we explore how much data on the sensitive a ribute is necessary to improve the fairness of the model. We vary the size of the dataset and observe the scale of the e ect on the desired metrics. In most cases, even using only 500 examples (1.5% of the training data) has a signi cant e ect on the fairness metrics. We show in Figure 4 one of the more conservative cases. Here, when testing with only low-income, gender-balanced samples, we still observe a strong e ect with relatively small datasets. is is especially encouraging for cases where the sensitive a ribute is expensive observe as even a small sample of that data is useful.
DISCUSSION
is work is motivated by the common challenges in observing sensitive a ributes during model training and serving. We nd a mixture of encouraging and challenging results. Encouragingly, we nd that even small samples of adversarial examples can be bene cial in improving model fairness. Additionally, although it may require more time or more complex techniques, we nd that having a balanced distribution of examples over the sensitive a ribute signi cantly improves fairness in the model. e empirical results here are also interesting relative to previous theoretical results. Where as [7] focuses on equality of outcomes, this method encourages unbiased latent representations inside the model. is appears to be a stronger condition if enforced exactly, which can be good for ensuring fairness but possibly harming model accuracy. In practice, we have observed that a more sensitive tuning of λ nds more amenable trade-o s.
CONCLUSION
In this work we have explored the e ect of data distributions during adversarial training of "fair" models. In particular, we have mode the following contributions:
(1) We connect the varying theoretical de nitions of fairness to training procedures over di erent data distributions for adversarially-trained fair representations. (2) We nd that using a balanced distribution over the sensitive a ribute for adversarial training is much more e ective than a random sample. (3) We empirically demonstrate the connection between the adversarial training data and the fairness metrics. (4) We observe that remarkably small datasets for adversarial training are e ective in encouraging more fair representations.
